报告人概况：李涛教授在美国纽约大学和德州大学达拉斯分校分别获得硕士学位，并于2012年获得德州大学达拉斯分校供应链管理专业博士学位。2012年加入美国圣克拉拉大学Leveay商学院，并获终身教职。他的主要研究领域是供应链管理。他在管理科学与工程领域的国际顶级杂志Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economics、International Journal of Production Research等发表多篇文章，也是国际顶级期刊国际顶级期刊Production and Operations Management资深编委。他曾经在纽约州立大学布法罗分校、德州大学达拉斯分校任教，并在多家企业如Procter & Gamble、Motorola in China、FujiTsu (Tianjin) Electronics和Woodward (Tianjin) Controls等任职，有丰富的教学、科研和实践经验。
报告概况：This research develops price and low-carbon competition models for vertically differentiated firms, which consists of one high-quality manufacturer (HM) and one low-quality manufacturer (LM). We investigate how manufacturers’ low-carbon behaviors are affected by factors such as the cap-and-trade regulation, consumers’ low-carbon preference and competing environment. Without the cap-and-trade regulation, as expected, we find that a manufacturer’s price and emission reduction rate are always strategic complements. Under the cap-and-trade regulation, however, a manufacturer’s price and emission reduction rate may be strategic substitutes when the carbon market price is high. Moreover, contrary to our intuition, our result shows that in most cases, a higher unit carbon quota can motivate the manufacturers to increase emission reduction rate. We demonstrate that, the implementation of cap-and-trade regulation cannot always motivate the manufacturer to increase his emission reduction rate. Furthermore, whether the carbon policy is conducive to the improvement of social welfare depends on the reasonable setting of carbon quota.